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A lot of people don’t realize how invasive this whole process is […] I’d love to hire 
you Tom, but Transport Canada says that you don’t get a security clearance. So I 
lose my job, but I’m not fired, and because you’re not fired there is no severance pay, 
and good luck at the federal court of Canada […] it’ll cost you twenty or twenty-five 
thousand dollars to get through. There’s no compensation. If you get there […] how 
many years has that been? I lose my family, I lose my house, I lose my job, and it’s 
all because there’s been a mistake, or somebody’s given erroneous or false 
information.1  
 
Over the past five years, governments around the world have been busy crafting new policies, institutions, and rationales for national securitization. Largely at the behest of the United States, 
they have been compelled to define a wide range of new security measures. The 
‘war on terror’ has focused heavily on securing the movement of people and 
goods across national borders, and the profiling of suspected terrorists on the 
basis of nationality, religion and ethnicity. This is the case, despite the fact that 
perhaps the only common thread to the various agents of non-state terror in the 
US, from Timothy McVeigh to Osama bin Laden, is some form of training by the 
US military.2 This incredible disjuncture between perceived ‘risks’ and response 
continues to inform dominant conceptions of security, as well as the practices 
they organize. While the control of human migration has intensified alongside 
the globalization of production over the past few decades, border control has 
nevertheless been rapidly reworked since 2001. Mobility has been newly 
constrained for many people, largely through racial profiling and its impacts on 
no-fly lists, security certificates, and international ‘information’ sharing. On the 
other hand, the movement of goods across national borders has been liberalized 
in recent decades to facilitate the massive volume of cargo movement that 
constitutes global trade. However, since 9/11, politicians and security officials 
have become increasingly concerned about the incredible volume of unchecked 
cargo crossing borders. They are particularly anxious about the mysterious 
contents of shipping containers.  
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The competing demands of ‘economy’ and ‘security’ have placed 
international ports at the centre of national security debates. In fact, key security 
initiatives target transport workers, who at once play a pivotal role in policing 
the territorial borders of the nation and are central to the global movement of 
goods. Security clearance programs are under development for port workers that 
will severely compromise employment security by making workers subject to 
extensive screenings that violate privacy, allow for job suspension based on 
‘reasonable suspicion’ of terrorist affiliation, and offer no independent appeals 
process. New security regulations threaten to institutionalize racial profiling and 
directly undermine collective agreements and civil rights. Moreover, there are 
plans to generalize these programs across the transport sector – a large part of 
the labour force that includes trucking, mass transit, airport, and rail. In this 
paper, I look at struggles over port security regulations in Canada. I discuss the 
creative political response, particularly by the International Longshore and 
Warehouse Union (ILWU) – Canada, which represents west coast port workers, 
in their coalition work to reform federal initiatives. I suggest that national 
security policy, as backdoor labour policy, works to institutionalize ‘anti-social’ 
forms of security. For port workers, security is already a dominant concern, but 
as these precedents are generalized beyond port workers, security policy will 
become an increasingly critical issue for the labour movement more broadly. 
 
‘SECURING’ MOBILITY: TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND THE 
BORDER  
 
Only nine days after September 11, 2001, the US government began a 
massive reorganization of domestic and international security infrastructure. 
This took place through the creation of the Office of Homeland Security ‘at 
home’, as well as by placing demands for significant regulatory change on 
foreign governments. International shipping was an important area of 
experimentation. The Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program defined and 
administered by American authorities, posts US customs officials in dozens of 
foreign ports to inspect US-bound cargo. The International Ship and Port-Facility 
Security (ISPS) code, on the other hand, is defined and administered by the 
United Nation’s International Marine Organization but was crafted at the direct 
behest of the United States. The ISPS defines minimum standards for security 
with which international ports and ships must comply. In 2004, the code came 
into effect globally. It was adopted by 152 nations and requires the compliance of 
55,000 ships and 20,000 ports. Signing countries must implement mandatory 
policies outlined in one part of the code, and more flexible, voluntary regulations 
in a second section of the ISPS. 
Transportation security has been an area of extensive Canadian 
cooperation with US securitization since 2001. Security initiatives have focused 
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on border crossings on land, air and sea, with Canadian officials largely adopting 
the analyses and priorities of their US counterparts. Mythologies of Canada’s 
‘leaky border’, which is said to be a ‘sieve for terrorists’, have circulated in 
official reports and documents south of the border, and have been adopted 
uncritically in the assessments of Canadian politicians and security officials. 
While Canadian ports have been screening containers at a higher rate than US 
ports for many years, US officials have nevertheless deemed these to be 
dangerous spaces that need to be secured (Larocque 2004, Cowen and Bunce 
2006). Canadian officials echo these assessments. For instance, in 2003, Canadian 
Senator Colin Kenny authored a report entitled Our Porous Ports, which 
marshalled these mythologies. Ironically, these accounts suggest that deferring to 
US demands and plans for security is an expression of Canadian sovereignty. As one 
report of Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on Security and National Defence 
(SSCOSND) outlined, a committee which Senator Kenny chairs, ‘passivity’ 
creates risks that “the United States will unilaterally move to defend its security 
perimeter – which it primarily defines as North America – without Canadian 
knowledge or consent.” Kenny and the SSCOSND argue that if Canada does not 
provide an adequate level of security at its ports, the United States is likely to 
take unilateral action (SSCOSND 2002:24). 
Immediately after 9/11, Transport Canada (TC) embarked on a 
tremendous expansion of people, policy and resources dedicated to security. 
Officials began “drafting and revising hundreds of security requirements” (TC 
web), while at the same time initiating a dramatic expansion of institutional 
strength in this area. The existence of a security component at TC is not new, but 
prior to 9/11 it consisted of a small group of inter-modal staff. After 2001, 
transport security was specialized and expanded such that an entire Maritime 
Security division was initiated, with 60 full time staff in Headquarters alone, and 
many rumored to be recruited from the US military and security ‘communities’. 
As early as October 11, 2001 the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working 
Group was formed, chaired by TC. This group worked to define agreements with 
the US over enhanced security, including eventually, a bilateral agreement with 
the US Coast Guard.  
A crucial task for the TC Marine Security division during the period after 
2001 was to define Canada’s interpretation of the ISPS code, to be implemented 
through the Marine Transportation Security Regulations (MTSR). Security and 
economy are deeply entwined in these regulations, as they are in other post 
9/11-security plans. TC insists that the new security requirements introduced in 
the MTSR are “consistent with the approach of Canada’s major trading 
partners.” These are provisions “determined to be necessary based on risk 
assessments and the need to ensure the unimpeded flow of Canadian maritime 
trade.” National security is conceptualized as interchangeable with the security 
of trade flows, and specifically, trade flows with the US. Indeed, one of four key 
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objectives of Canada’s 2001 Anti-Terrorism Plan, Bill C-36, is “to keep the 
Canada-U.S. border secure and open to legitimate trade.” Maintaining trade 
flows with the US is also the basis of the policy and language of TC. This 2003 
statement could hardly be more direct: 
 
Canada’s marine sector supports a vital trade gateway, connecting Canada to 
the world. In 2000, Canadian international marine trade, including traffic 
between Canada and the U.S., was valued at more than $100 billion, one-
eighth of our total trade. Canada’s marine sector employs more than 30,000 
people. The Government of Canada’s marine security package is designed to 
help protect the Canadian marine sector by implementing initiatives to 
increase our capacity to prevent, detect and manage security threats.  
 
‘SECURING’ PORT WORKERS 
 
Regulating port workers has been a central thrust of marine security 
plans in Canada and internationally. The ISPS code includes minimum standards 
for accessing and handling cargo, however governments are free to define the 
specific means for meeting or exceeding them. Transport Canada’s initial 
proposal for worker security well exceeded the requirements of the ISPS code. 
The Marine Facilities Restricted Area Access Clearance Program (MFRAACP), 
proposed to create secure areas around ports and regulate access for workers 
with a security clearance. Access to restricted areas would be granted following 
extensive background checks on workers and their families including credit 
checks, details about immigration status, information about skin, hair and eye 
colour, and travel histories. Workers who were successful in obtaining clearance 
would carry identity cards that would be linked to security perimeters 
surrounding ports. The Minister of Transportation would be free to designate 
restricted areas according to his own discretion.  
The MFAACP was modeled after the Airport Restricted Area Access 
Clearance Program, implemented in the wake of the 1985 Air India bombings, 
now commonly and awkwardly referred to as ‘Canada’s 9/11’. TC initially 
planned to finalize the MFRAACP in November 2004, and anticipated spending 
$11.8 million of their own funds as well as $1.9 million from the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) and $7.1 from the Canadian Security and Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) on the initiative. However, TC was off on all counts. They 
radically underestimated the amount of resistance that would emerge in 
response to the proposed regulation, and so the time and cost associated with 
developing new regulations. Critique of the MFRAACP came from diverse 
groups with wide ranging concerns. In Vancouver, home to Canada’s largest 
port and the place where security regulations were initially developed, longshore 
and warehouse workers, maritime employers, cruise ship operators, and even 
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the Port of Vancouver raised concerns. These focused on the foundational 
assumptions about port operations that informed TC’s conception of security, 
and which made the airport an inappropriate model for marine security.  
Crucial differences characterize port and airport operations that implicate 
both the spatial and social organization of work, and so its potential 
securitization. For instance, it is well established among marine security 
specialists that in order to protect containers from tampering, security needs to 
be addressed throughout the complex spatial networks that constitute 
contemporary cargo distribution; from their initial packing at production sites all 
over the world, and across the inter-modal and international transport networks 
that take them to distribution centers and consumer markets3. The ILWU-Canada 
picked up on this point and argued that meaningful security was undermined by 
the proposed regulations that targeted a small circumscribed area, and so only a 
small subset of people with access to containers, for security screening. Managers 
and employees of shipping companies who did not work within the restricted 
areas of the port, even people who pack containers a few yards from the 
designated restricted zone, would not be subject to the MFRAACP.  
Airport work is also an inappropriate model for the port security because 
of its social organization. Airport work is a highly casualized form of 
employment and so the federal government was able to push through 
regulations for airport workers without much consultation or concern for labour 
or civil rights. However, this strong-arm approach would not work in the ports 
where unions have proud histories of worker solidarity and have waged bold 
struggles for employment security and international social justice.  
The ILWU-Canada has been at the forefront of challenges to the proposed 
regulations. In meetings, written reports, and media articles, they have argued 
that the MFRAACP was “offensive” to the “rights, freedoms, and privacy” of 
ILWU members, by virtue of the demand for excessive personal and family 
information including unspecified information on spouses, parents, and spouses’ 
parents, details about postsecondary institutions attended, credit history, 
criminal history, personal details including skin colour, and five years of 
residential, employment, and international travel history (ILWU 2004). Workers 
would furthermore have to reapply for the security clearance every 5 years. The 
ILWU also critiqued the broad scope and weak protection of information that 
would be collected by the CSIS and the RCMP, citing the “highly subjective and 
fundamentally unjust security clearance criteria”, based on suspicion without 
any need to demonstrate charges or convictions, and importantly, the lack of an 
independent appeals process. The ILWU highlighted the fact that the sweeping 
and subjective nature of ‘reasonable suspicion’ as grounds for denying clearance 
meant that members could potentially lose their employment “on the basis of 
concerns that go well beyond those of preventing terrorist acts” (ILWU 2004)4.  
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The implications for employment security were severe; proposed 
regulations would make workers vulnerable to indiscriminate suspension, thus 
directly undermining collective agreements, as well as creating potential for 
employers to exploit the regulations in order to deliberately circumvent 
collective agreements. The ILWU emphasized how uneven the impact of the 
proposed regulations could be in terms of creating insecurity for particular 
groups of workers. They outlined how the regulations would institutionalize 
racial profiling and systemic discrimination based on national origin, and could 
be used to target union activists and other dissident political voices. The 
MFRAACP was “a carefully veiled employment discrimination policy through 
the application of various types of stereotyping – racial, political, union activist, 
etc.” they argued (ILWU 2004, emphasis in original). A documented history of 
racial profiling within Canadian Security and Intelligence institutions, alongside 
the significant pressure to expedite large numbers of security clearances by an 
already overburdened security bureaucracy, would create all the conditions to 
rationalize racial profiling. The RCMP and CSIS, who are responsible for security 
checks, are widely known to be engaging in racial profiling of just this sort (Clark 
2005, O’Neil 2004, Teotonio 2006). In the wake of the Maher Arar inquiry, 
countless groups and individuals, including even Conservative Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, recommended better oversight of the operations of CSIS, the 
RCMP and Transport Canada. Transport Canada’s recent ‘information package’ 
on the security clearances, in fact, directly outlines how “travel history is 
collected to see if an applicant has traveled to a country where there may be 
security concerns” (TC 2006). This clearly is a direct invitation for the profiling of 
‘risky’ workers based on simplistic assumptions about ‘risky’ regions. 
Importantly, the ILWU also suggested that the MFRAACP could be used 
to target workers for crime as easily as for suspected terrorist affiliation. They 
questioned how national security would be served by this blurring of categories, 
and how any form of security could be instituted by undermining the privacy, 
security and civil rights of citizens. This concern is a serious one. It has become 
common sense among security ‘experts’ that the boundary between terror and 
crime is an outdated one and simply slows them down in their ‘hunt’. ‘Crime 
and risk consultant’ and author Chris Mathers recently explained in an interview 
in Canadian Security Magazine, “organized crime and terrorism are two horns of 
the same goat.” He repeated American mythologies that these are particular 
problems for Canada because of its “relaxed approaches to immigration and 
criminal prosecution and because it is adjacent to both one of the largest markets 
and the largest target in the world — the United States.” The blurring of terror 
and crime is furthermore the foundation for a spate of new security and defense 
policy in the US. As H. Allen Holmes, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
has said, special operations forces are increasingly working at “the seam between 
war and crime” (Goss 2006). Indeed, countless security and ‘anti-terrorism’ 
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strategies5 redefine military and civilian authority through programs like 
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities [MACA], Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities [DSCA] and emergency preparedness (NYT 2006). 
In all this, the ILWU focused their lobby for reform on the three most 
pernicious elements of the plan for labour: the lack of meaningful appeals 
process, the scope of information collected for the security clearance, and the 
range of workers who would be subject to the screening. None of these elements 
of the proposed regulations had the potential to enhance security of any kind.  
 
COMPETITIVE CITIES AND SECURITY 
 
The ILWU, working with the support of the Canadian Labour Congress, 
was largely rebuffed by TC in their efforts to reform regulations. But port 
workers were not the only ones who saw major problems with the MFRAACP. 
The British Columbia Maritime Employers Association (BCMEA), and cruise 
ship and terminal operators were all concerned about the effects of the 
regulations on the efficiency and competitiveness of the port. Port cities work in 
tight relations of competition with neighbouring port cities. National security 
policy was presenting itself as a significant obstacle to competitiveness in that it 
would potentially make the efficiencies of less securitized ports a competitive 
advantage. This is because the spatial logic of national security, when 
conceptualized as a tightening of national borders, directly interferes with 
supranational trade flows that are so crucial to globalized production systems. 
Corporations that rely on the transnational movement of goods have been 
reliable opponents of border security initiatives. For example, in order to keep 
the massive volume of commodities flowing from production in Asia to US 
markets, Wal-Mart has been systematically subverting port security initiatives 
for several years (AFL-CIO 2006). ‘National security’ may have been “a code 
word for the defence of powerful business interests” (Kinsman et al 2000: 3) in 
the past, however, in an era of global production where a ‘geo-economic’ more 
than ‘geopolitical’ logic is dominant in organizing the geography of political and 
economic power (Smith 2004, Cowen & Smith 2006), this claim needs to be 
reassessed. As The Economist (2002) has observed, “there is tension between the 
needs of international security and those of global trade.” In this context, the 
shifting geographies of production have yielded some surprising informal and 
formal coalitions against national securitization. 
Despite a long history of opposition at the negotiating table, the ILWU 
and the BCMEA agreed to work together in a strategic alliance to lobby for 
change. They set out to build a broad coalition of local voices in order to push TC 
to address their concerns. Through letter writing campaigns and formal and 
informal presentations to employers’ groups in the Vancouver area, the ILWU – 
BCMEA coalition mobilized the official support of dozens of marine 
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organizations. They organized delegations to municipal council meetings, and by 
March of 2005, three councils passed motions calling for the federal government 
to revisit the MFRAACP. The Vancouver, North Vancouver, and Burnaby 
councils endorsed the coalition in their critique of federal proposals and called 
for security plans that would be less intrusive and more focused on actual 
security threats. City councilors made eloquent speeches at council meetings that 
connected the MFRAACP to other instances of damaging government incursions 
into civil rights and political freedoms in the name of national security. They 
named the October Crisis and the Maher Arar case as important precedents that 
must be avoided in the future.6  
The work of the coalition against the federal government reveals some of 
the tensions between national security projects and an urban-based vision of 
economic competitiveness.  A geopolitical vision of territorial sovereignty and 
strong national borders stands in conflict with an urban scale vision of global 
competitiveness, promoted through the ‘creativity’ and efficiency of local actors 
and infrastructure. These tensions persist even as both projects are anchored in 
neoliberal conceptions of economy. 
Largely as a result of the economic clout of many of the partners who 
endorsed the Vancouver coalition’s position, TC was compelled to make some 
concessions in the proposed regulations. Some of these concessions were purely 
symbolic, like the renaming of the MFRAACP in June 2005 to the Marine 
Transport Security Clearance Program (MTSCP), which TC staff thought was less 
aggressive sounding than the ‘frap’ of the old acronym. More substantive 
changes followed a major multi-party review of options for the security 
clearance. In 2005, TC announced that a ‘pilot project’ would take place in 
Vancouver, to be followed by a similar trial in Montreal and Halifax. Leading up 
to the pilot project, the coalition hired a consultant to perform a ‘process flow’ 
mapping that aimed to educate TC on the spatial configuration of contemporary 
port work. This mapping helped convince TC that a blanket application of the 
security clearance to everyone working within a designtated area would not 
contribute to security. But the pilot project, which began in September of 2005, 
was terminated somewhat abruptly in late July of 2006. TC gave labour three 
days notice before the reformed regulations were published in the Canada 
Gazette, part 1. This was before the Montreal and Halifax reviews were even 
initiated. Despite active opposition to the reformed regulations the regulatory 
amendments were published in the Canada Gazette, part 2, on November 15, 
and the following day, Minister of Transport Infrastructure and Communities, 
Laurence Cannon, announced the program’s implementation. 
TC claims to have “used stakeholder input throughout the development 
of the proposed regulations and has incorporated substantial changes [to the 
proposed regulations] as a result” (TC 2006). These changes are in three areas. 
First, TC claims to have developed “a risk-based criteria to focus the proposed 
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MTSCP on specific designated duties and smaller restricted areas” that would 
require security clearance, however, the details of this criteria remain a mystery 
to labour unions and the Minister retains the power to unilaterally designate 
restricted port areas. Second, TC claims to have established an independent 
review mechanism for the MTSCP, however, the proposed ‘Office of 
Reconsideration’ would be located within TC and the review would include the 
staff person who initially refused a security clearance. Finally, Transport Canada 
claims that the regulations would “only request the minimum information 
required to provide for a fair and effective assessment of an applicant’s risk to 
the security of the marine transportation system,” and yet, while the reformed 
regulations do indeed reduce the range of information to be collected for the 
clearance, the protection of that information is actually weaker than in the initial 
proposals. The MFRAACP contained a provision that the information collected 
would not be used for any purpose other than determining whether or not the 
person was a threat to national security. ILWU president, Tom Dufresne (2006), 
explains that this clause “was taken out of the MFRAACP which caused us a lot 
of concern. But they put back in a watered down version saying that they would 
be governed by the Privacy Act, which is not as good as the other. We wanted a 
provision that would say that the information would not be shared with foreign 
governments or with anyone else outside of Transport Canada. In other words, 
the information would go into a sealed box in the corner and the only people 
who have access to it would be Marine Security Personnel.” 
The ILWU remains deeply concerned about the regulations, however, 
other actors who were central to the coalition like the BCMEA, are largely 
satisfied (Pasacreta 2006, Kee 2006). It seems that TC’s concessions may have 
created a strategic wedge in the powerful, although perhaps transient, 
Vancouver coalition. This raises profound questions for the future of economic 





[Unions and their members] would never agree to have a collective agreement with no 
grievance procedure in it, without some final arbitrator making the decision on whether 
or not a person is guilty of an offence or what the penalty should be. And yet, with the 
security regulation - the internal review they’re proposing – there is no independent, 
transparent, affordable appeals process other than going to the federal court of Canada. 
And then all you might get is ‘by the way, you were right’. Who do I go to for 
compensation? There is no compensation. (Dufresne, 2006) 
 
What does it mean that national security policy is quietly dismantling 
social protection? Social security has not always been a casualty of war. In fact, 
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crises of national security have historically been important moments for the 
genesis of social forms of security (Cowen 2005, 2006). In the past, the wartime 
strength of organized labour, in conjunction with the state’s need for productive 
and reproductive labour, combined and yielded social protections. As eminent 
welfare state scholar Frances Piven (2004: 3) has argued, “historically, 
governments waging war sooner or later tried to compensate their people for the 
blood and wealth they sacrificed,” but “this period is markedly different.” 
Indeed, today, we hear little talk of building national society through social 
security. Neoliberal globalization has shattered the national nexus such that new 
demands for security are drowning out social forms of security. Security 
discourse is everywhere, and it is often still described as a national project, but in 
a competitive world of global trade we are told that security is a Darwinian 
project of economic survival. This is clear in the major Canadian security 
documents discussed earlier that equate security and the flow of trade. The 
Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence recently explained 
that “the first national imperative is the same as the first human imperative: 
survival” (SSCONSD 2004).  
The challenge for today’s security state is not to eliminate the border but 
to reconfigure it. North American states may be adopting some of the rhetoric of 
continental integration and even working to standardize key policies, for 
example through the Security and Prosperity Partnership Agreements, but there 
is no parallel here to the European ‘solution’ of loosening national borders to 
supranational labour7 and citizenship rights. As the SSCONSD (2005) argues, 
“we need the border,” as it provides a “necessary separation of two discrete 
societies; and border crossings are valuable for monitoring the movement of 
people and goods between those societies to ensure that only legitimate people 
and goods pass back and forth.” The border was never simply a line on a map, 
but its form and effects are becoming more complex today – particularly the 
maritime border. For instance, the Container Security Initiative extends the US 
border into ports of other countries around the world, meanwhile, Canada’s 
MTSCP blurs ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security and surveillance by mixing state 
technologies for fighting terror and crime. 
Alongside these dominant visions of security, port workers have been 
actively articulating alternative conceptions. These operate at very different 
spatial scales and prioritize security at the scale of the body of the worker through 
extensive lobbying for strengthened occupational health and safety legislation in 
a notoriously dangerous workplace. It was, in fact, work slowdowns in response 
to a growing number of workplace fatalities that provoked the massive struggles 
of the west coast US ports in 2002, culminating in the President’s invocation of 
the Taft-Hartley Act. Port and transport workers’ unions, operating at multiple 
scales, prioritize a socially secure and stable workforce that is well trained to 
handle the responsibilities that come with heightened insecurity in the 
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workplace. Longshore workers also lobby for transnational economic security in 
solidarity with working peoples around the world. The ILWU has consistently 
organized actions against U.S. imperialism, coordinated labour actions with port 
workers around the world, and supported fair trade initiatives. 
This begs the question of the potential for organizing strategies to contest 
dominant forms of security and strengthen alternatives. The case of the MTSCP 
suggests that there are both opportunities and limitations for labour to work in 
coalition with agents of competitive city politics, including their own employers. 
Tufts (2004: 50) looks at the “complexity and range of tactics being used by 
labour as they exercise agency in capitalist global cities,” and sees their 
endorsement of competitive city visions as, in part, multi-scalar tactics through 
which they attempt to regulate “the harsher economic realities.” Indeed, port 
workers’ unions had enough in common with employers to jointly oppose 
national security plans. These critiques were framed out of concern for the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the port, as well as the civil and economic 
rights of workers.  And yet, the common ground may not be solid enough to 
sustain lasting partnerships committed to alternatives for workers. In fact, one 
reading is that employers lobbied for reform until their own concerns for 
efficiency were met, and then largely accepted the pernicious effects for workers 
that persist. TC may have even found a strategic means of taking steam out of the 
coalition sails by offering concessions that would effectively satisfy some, but not 
all its members.  
The Vancouver coalition was always conceptualized as a strategic alliance 
to respond to the immediate challenges of proposed regulations. However, 
security policy is a bigger beast than any single union, city, or even sector can 
slay. In the struggle against anti-social forms of security, the labour movement 
might find more lasting solidarity in the diverse social movements that are 
actively challenging the pernicious effects of securitization for citizenship. Given 
that security policy simultaneously undermines basic civil rights and labour 
protections, like in the case of the ports, through, for instance, racial profiling and 
the invasion of privacy, substantive solidarity may come from a more overt 
social unionism. Granted this is the longterm labour of movement building and 
is well underway at the Canadian Labour Congress, but no doubt, the 
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